ProSolution frontend session poisoning permits arbitrary file deletion
ProSolution WP Client through 2.0.8 exposes the frontend nonce needed by proSol_fileUploadModalProcess and proSol_fileDeleteProcess. An unauthenticated attacker first uses the upload-modal handler to place a traversal path into their session, then supplies that session key as filename to proSol_fileDeleteProcess, which lacks adequate path validation. This permits deletion of arbitrary server files and can lead to code execution when a critical file such as wp-config.php is removed. The public.
- Component
- ProSolution WP Client
- Plugin slug
prosolution-wp-client- Affected
- <= 2.0.8
- Safe version
2.0.9- Published
- Aug 16, 2026
This CVE was published Aug 16, 2026 and is one of 10 known issues for this plugin.
Update, patch or deactivate.
Update the affected component to 2.0.9 or later. The official upstream changelog identifies this release as addressing CVE-2026-14524.
A safe version is available, so updating to that version or later is the preferred remediation. If an immediate update is not practical, consider a targeted application patch or temporarily restricting the affected functionality.
Deactivate only when warranted by your risk profile, or when advised by your hosting provider in the limited circumstances where the vulnerability cannot otherwise be mitigated. If you’re unsure which action is appropriate, contact Fused or your hosting provider for guidance.
Technical description
The ProSolution WP Client plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file deletion due to insufficient file path validation in the proSol_fileDeleteProcess function in all versions up to, and including, 2.0.8. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete arbitrary files on the server, which can easily lead to remote code execution when the right file is deleted (such as wp-config.php). An attacker must first call the proSol_fileUploadModalProcess handler to poison their own session with a path-traversal key, then call proSol_fileDeleteProcess with that key as the filename parameter; both steps require only the publicly exposed frontend nonce.
CVE / CNA vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H